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This paper explores the conflict of real and monetary convergence during the EMU run-up of the 
future Central and Eastern European (CEE) EU member states. Based on a Balassa-Samuelson model 
of productivity driven inflation, it compares the policy options which might make the compliance 
possible, i.e., fiscal tightening and nominal appreciation within the ERM2 band. Nominal appreciation 
within ERM2 seems the better option to achieve the compliance with the Maastricht criteria as no 
discretionary government intervention is necessary and losses in terms of real growth are less. Having 
once opted for nominal appreciation within ERM2 by fixing the ERM2 entry rate as the ERM2 central 
rate (Irish model), a high degree of flexibility is provided in coping with erratic short-term capital 
inflows. Setting the ERM2 entry rate below or above the ERM2 central rate (Greek model) implies a 
clear exchange rate path within ERM2 and thereby less exchange rate volatility. But the Greek model 
also requires accurate information about the future exchange rate path and strict fulfilment of the 
Maastricht criteria within the projected time frame. Despite the merits of nominal appreciation, 
countries committed to hard euro pegs might choose fiscal contraction as the second best solution.  
Keywords 
EMU, EU eastern enlargement, Balassa-Samuelson effect, real appreciation, monetary union, Central 
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1. Introduction 
In the new millennium the European integration process has gained momentum. By 2004 ten mostly 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, as well as Cyprus and Malta) will join the European 
Union. Bulgaria and Romania are expected to follow by 2006.  
  The eastern enlargement of the European Union (EU) also heralds the enlargement of the 
European Monetary Union (EMU). Many of the CEE countries have expressed their strong intention 
to join the EMU as soon as possible. As enhanced macroeconomic stability and lower interest rates 
seem beneficial for long-term growth, early EMU accession is a rational choice.  
But before the new EU members will be able to join the EMU, a sustained process of monetary and real 
convergence will be necessary. The Maastricht criteria for EMU membership require the EU and EMU 
accession candidates to adjust inflation, interest rates, public debt and nominal exchange rates to the EMU level.  
The requirement of monetary convergence has triggered a broad discussion about the achievability 
of the Maastricht criteria for the new EMU accession candidates. Based on the finding of Balassa 
(1964) and Samuelson (1964) that countries in the economic catch-up face higher productivity growth 
in the traded goods sector and thereby higher inflation, the incompatibility of the Maastricht inflation 
and exchange rate criteria has been stressed (Halpern and Wyplosz, 2001; Buiter and Grafe, 2002; De 
Broeck and Sløk, 2002; Égert et al., 2002). 
How should the new EU members cope with the convergence dilemma? As a renegotiation of the 
Maastricht criteria seems improbable the governments of the accession candidates might take economic 
policy action. Fiscal tightening dampens the Balassa-Samuelson effect. A reinterpretation of the ERM2 
exchange rate mechanism provides room for productivity adjustment by nominal appreciation. 
2. Is the Enlarged European Union an Optimum Currency Area? 
The accession of the CEE countries to the European Monetary Union has been widely discussed under 
the framework of the theory of optimum currency area (OCA) as put forward by Mundell (1961) and 
McKinnon (1963). The main criteria applied are openness and asymmetric shocks.
1 Within the OCA 
framework countries considering joining a monetary union will weigh the potential benefits of 
exchange stability for international trade against the costs of giving up monetary policy independence.  
Open economies with close trade linkages to the EU will benefit from irrevocably fixed exchange 
rates as the transaction costs for international trade decline. With the cost of (hedging) foreign 
exchange risk eliminated more division of labour within the enlarged Euro Area is expected to 
increase welfare. Frankel and Rose (2002) have suggested that the merits of monetary union 
membership are quite significant—trade with other currency union members is assumed to triple (!) 
thereby boosting real growth and welfare gains.
2  
As shown in Figure 1 which takes exports to the EU15 as percentage of GDP to be an indicator for 
OCA openness, the CEE countries qualify without doubt for the EMU. Today trade to EU15 as 
percentage of GDP is about as high for the CEE accession candidates as for the present EMU 
                                                      
1   As asymmetric shocks can be absorbed more easily if labour markets are flexible, labour mobility and wage flexibility 
have been other criteria. 
2   Because currency unions before EMU mainly linked small, low income countries the impact can be assumed less on 
more developed countries. A study of the British HM Treasury (2003) concludes that a reasonable range for the potential 
increase in UK trade with the Euro Area resulting from EMU membership would be in the range of 5% to 50%.  Paul de Grauwe and Gunther Schnabl 
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members after more than four years EMU membership.
3 Exports to the EU as percentage of GDP 
average 28.7% for the CEE countries in comparison to 26.8% for the EMU member states (2001). The 
economic integration with the EU is much stronger for the CEE countries than for the EMU ‘outs’ 
Denmark, Sweden and UK (16.5% in average).  










































Source: IMF: Direction of Trade Statistics. 
Thus, according to the OCA openness criterion the euro seems the natural anchor for exchange rate 
stabilization in Central and Eastern Europe. Flexible exchange rates might be more beneficial, 
however, if asymmetric real shocks hit the CEE economies in which case adjustment via monetary 
policy and nominal exchange rates is easier than through wages and prices.
4 
To this end tracing asymmetric shocks in the CEE economies with respect to the Euro Area has 
gained wide attention. Buiter and Grafe (2002) analyse the heterogeneity of national incomes 
structures and co-movements of inventory cycles and conclude that CEE business cycles are by no 
means being synchronized with the EU. Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2002) use a correlation analysis of 
business cycles and a VAR methodology as proposed by Blanchard and Quah (1989) to measure the 
degree of demand and supply shocks within the enlarged European Union.
5 Based on the assumption 
that demand shocks are temporary and supply shocks are persistent with respect to output, Fidrmuc 
and Korhonen (2002) find that for the most accession countries the shocks are significantly more 
idiosyncratic with regard to the European Union than for the present EU members. 
Given that the economic structures and business cycles in Central and Eastern Europe are quite different 
from the present European Union in combination with the assumption that labour mobility and wages 
flexibility are restricted, the CEE countries probably do not qualify for EMU accession—at least if the 
OCA criteria are applied (De Grauwe, 2002). Nevertheless, EMU accession seems to be tempting as most 
                                                      
3   Membership in a currency union is expected to increase trade integration among the members. Micco, Stein and Ordoñez 
(2003) argue that EMU membership has increased bilateral trade between the present members by 9% to 20% compared 
with trade among non-EMU countries. 
4   As contributed by Kenen (1969) asymmetric shocks might be less likely when the structure of production and demand is diversified.  
5   The study follows a similar exercise done for the present EMU members by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993). Nominal versus Real Convergence with Respect to EMU Accession 
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CEE countries have expressed their strong intention to join the EMU as soon as possible.
6 The reasons lie 
beyond the OCA framework: Mundells (1961) Keynesian approach
7 does not account for the positive 
growth stimulus of macroeconomic stability, lower interest rates and the endogeneity of the OCA criteria.  
First, during the 1990s the Central and Eastern European transition economies have struggled for 
macroeconomic stabilization like most developing countries and emerging markets—with mixed 
success. Even though inflation rates fell during most of the 1990s they still remained high. Only the 
start of the EU accession process triggered a fast convergence of inflation rates towards the Western 
European level (Figure A in the appendix). The process towards EMU membership, which implies the 
adoption of the Maastricht inflation and exchange rate criteria, will further enhance the need for price 
stability
8 and thus contribute to a stable (and thereby higher) long-term growth performance.  
Second, based on macroeconomic and exchange rate stability, falling risk premiums on interest 
rates might add an additional growth impulse via capital markets.
9 While most emerging markets face 
high risk premiums on interest rates due to ‘original sin’
10 (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999), the 
CEE economies have the unique opportunity to import—credibly and irrevocably—the reputation of 
the European Central Bank. Through the participation in the highly developed European capital 
markets, low nominal and real interest rates can be expected to spur the real economic catch-up.
11  
Third, Frankel and Rose (1998) have stressed the endogeneity of the optimum currency area 
criteria. If trade integration rises after EMU accession due to the elimination of foreign exchange risk, 
business cycles will probably correlate more. More synchronized business cycles will also spring from 
the common monetary policy. To this end—as it has already been proven by the EMU accession of the 
southern European countries—the optimum currency area criteria are more likely to be fulfilled after 
EMU entry thereby further stressing the long-term gains of joining the EMU. 
3. The Institutional Framework for EMU Accession 
Given the long-term merits of EMU membership it seems rational that most CEE economies want to 
join the EMU as soon as possible. Figure 2 shows the fastest time path for EMU membership. For 
these countries, which will join the EU in year 2004, the fastest EMU accession period can be sub-
divided into three sub-periods: 
•  a pre-EU accession period ranging from 1998/99 up to 2004 (1), 
•  a post-EU pre-EMU accession period ranging from 2004 up to 2006 (2), 
•  a post-EMU accession period starting in 2006 (3). 
                                                      
6   Estonia planned to adopt the euro as official currency even before its EU accession in 2002. The Hungarian Central Bank 
states that the ‘accession to the Economic and Monetary Union is one of the most important steps in Hungary’s European 
integration, which will entail abandoning the national currency and adopting the euro as domestic legal tender.’ (Csajbók and 
Csermely 2002: 1). The Bank of Slovenia has clearly defined the medium-term monetary goal ‘to gain access to the EMU as 
soon as possible’ (Bank of Slovenia, 2002: 8). The Lithuanian government decided to re-peg its currency from the dollar to 
the euro in order to join ERM2 and EMU as soon as possible after EU accession (Alonso-Gamo et. al., 2002: 4). 
7   For a critical review of Mundell (1961) see McKinnon (2002). McKinnon (2002) also stresses Mundell’s argument that within an 
environment of international capital mobility a monetary union might be beneficial to adjust more easily to asymmetric shocks. 
8   For more detailed analysis of the interdependence of the EU, ERM2 and EMU accession process and macroeconomic stability see section 3. 
9   Further, the Maastricht fiscal criteria might contribute to lower interest rates as public debt is constrained. 
10  As development countries and emerging markets have a long tradition of inflation and depreciation, capital markets are 
strongly fragmented and risk premiums for default risk and exchange rate variability are usually high. 
11  Indeed, with the EU (and possible EMU) accession approaching, short-term interest rates have converged towards the EMU 
level (Figure B in the appendix). Further, EMU membership would shield the CEE economies against speculative attacks.  Paul de Grauwe and Gunther Schnabl 
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The respective sub-periods on the way to full EMU membership have different implications for the 
monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies of the accession countries: 
(1) The pre-EU accession period is assumed to have started with the EU accession negotiations in 
1998/99 and will end with the final accession in 2004 (possibly 2007 in the case of Bulgaria and 
Romania). Although the preparation for EU accession does not impose any concrete requirements on 
monetary and exchange rate policies in terms of specific criteria the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty 
as legal EU framework narrows the margin of macroeconomic discretion considerably.  
In detail the EC Treaty, which is part of the Acquis Communautaire, states that the economic policies 
of the EU members are of common concern and shall be coordinated (art. 103, 1). The European Council 
monitors the economic developments in each member state to ensure convergence (art. 103, 3). Loans by 
the central bank to the government and related organizations are forbidden (art. 104). The countries have 
to avoid budget deficits and have to comply with the rules of the stability and growth pact (art. 104c). 
Figure 2: Fastest Time Path of EMU Accession for the CEE countries 
1998/99 2004  2006  2008
pre-EU accession period  post-EU-pre-EMU accession 
period 
post EMU accession period 
  EU accession  EMU accession   
(unilateral informal exchange 
rate stabilization) 
ERM2 membership  EMU membership 
 
As the EC Treaty does not place any direct constraints on the exchange rate policies, up to the present the 
exchange rate regimes in Central and Eastern Europe have remained rather heterogeneous.
12 But with 
inflation declining the chronic depreciations of most CEE currencies have abated (Figure C in the appendix). 
(2) The restrictions on macroeconomic policies will get tighter as the countries enter the EU in 
2004. The targets of the convergence process during the post-EU pre-EMU accession period are 
specified by the Maastricht criteria for EMU membership (art. 109j EC treaty), which have to be 
fulfilled at the end (monetary and fiscal criteria) and during (exchange rate criterion) the EMU run-up. 
The fastest time period for the EMU run-up can be assumed to be from 2004 (start of EU membership) 
to 2006 (earliest year of EMU entry). 
Although the new members ‘will not be expected to transfer their monetary sovereignty to the EU’ 
(ECB 2000: 46), inflation rates are expected to converge further towards the EMU benchmark, as the 
new member states ‘will consequently be integrated into the European System of Central Banks’ 
(ECB, 2000: 46).
13 To enter EMU, inflation in the accession countries must not exceed the average 
inflation of the three EU member states with the lowest inflation by more than 1.5% (art. 109j EC 
Treaty and the respective protocol).
14  
                                                      
12  While one group of countries has moved towards tighter pegs to the euro, a second group has (officially) moved towards 
more exchange rate flexibility (Schnabl, 2003). 
13  In accordance with article 122 EC Treaty the acceding countries will join immediately the monetary union albeit as 
member states with a derogation (ECB, 2000: 46). 
14  As one or more of these countries might not belong to the euro zone, Gros et al. (2002: 83-84) recommend a revision of 
the Maastricht inflation criterion: Now that the euro area exists, the average euro-area wide inflation is the ‘natural’ 
benchmark. The same applies for the Maastricht interest rate criterion. Nominal versus Real Convergence with Respect to EMU Accession 
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Although EU membership does not entail any direct provisions for exchange rate policy, the new 
EU member states will have to ‘treat […] exchange rate policy as a matter of common interest’ (Art. 
109m EC Treaty). Exchange rate policy has to support other economic policies to ensure nominal and 
real convergence (ECOFIN, 2000).
15 More precisely, EU membership—though not directly required 
by the EC Treaty—implies a tacit pressure to join ERM2—probably soon after having achieved EU 
membership (no opt out clause).
16 The new member states ‘can be’ (ECOFIN, 1997) and ‘will be’ 
(ECOFIN, 2000) expected to join ERM2 some time after accession.
17 ‘ In their progress towards 
adopting the euro [the EMU accession candidates] are expected to participate in the exchange rate 
mechanism (ERMII)’ (ECB, 2000: 46). Moreover, without any regard to the obligation to ERM2 
membership, most CEE countries want to join ERM2 as soon as possible (section 2).  
The ERM2 membership will put an additional restriction on the exchange rate policies as the new members 
have to agree with the EU on a central rate with a fluctuation band of ±15.0% (ECOFIN, 1997).
18 EMU 
membership will require the accession candidates to stay within the fluctuation band for at least two years 
without devaluing against the currency of any other member state (art. 109j and the respective protocol).
19 
(3) Joining the EMU is lastly dependent upon the European Commission and the ECB report to the 
European Council on the progress the accession candidates have made towards fulfilling the 
Maastricht criteria. On the basis of these reports, the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a 
recommendation from the Commission, decides on EMU membership (art 109j, 3). 
In the post-EMU accession period, which starts in the earliest case in 2007, inflation and exchange 
rates are treated asymmetrically. After having joined the monetary union, there are no particular 
constraints on inflation. While monetary sovereignty is ceded to the ECB, inflation and long-term 
interest rates are allowed to differ among the EMU members.
20 In contrast, nominal exchange rates are 
‘irrevocably fixed’
21 (art. 109l), as the new EMU members adopt the euro as legal tender.  
4. The Balassa-Samuelson Model with Respect to EMU Accession 
While the path to the EMU accession of the Central and Eastern European countries described above 
could be seen as an optimal way to join the EMU, the CEE countries have to pass the Maastricht 
bottleneck as a precondition for membership. As the Balassa-Samuelson effect for the transition 
economies is ‘now well established and powerful’ (Begg et. al., 2001: ix), the impact of fast 
productivity catch-up on inflation could be a considerable impediment to EMU membership.  
                                                      
15  ‘As the exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro generally plays a fundamental role for these countries, the faster the process of 
integration moves towards a single market and economic convergence with the EU/euro area, the stronger the case for the 
stability of the nominal exchange rates vis-à-vis the euro will become.’ (ECB 2000, 44). 
16  Deutsche Bundesbank (2003: 19) argues that due to the complex process of adjustment a high degree of exchange rate 
flexibility might be the better choice thereby suggesting a ‘careful timing’ of ERM2 accession.  
17  ‘The single market must not be endangered by real exchange-rate misalignments, or by excessive nominal exchange rate 
fluctuations between the euro and other EU currencies’ (ECOFIN, 1997). 
18  ERM2 membership requires ‘disciplined monetary policies directed towards price stability.’ ‘Sound fiscal and structural 
policies in all Member States are, at least, essential for sustainable exchange-rate stability.’ (ECOFIN 1997). 
19  The Deutsche Bundesbank (2003: 18-20) argues that ERM2 membership shall be without tension or devaluation. ERM2 
membership should not be understood as ‘waiting room’ for EMU membership, but as distinct stage in monetary 
convergence (‘internship’). The EMU candidate countries might want to stay as short as possible, as indicated for Poland 
by Borowski and Brzoza-Brzezina and Szpunar (2003). The European Commission (2002: 13) gives an overview about 
expected ERM2 participation of the accession candidates. 
20  Government deficits remain under the control of the stability and growth pact. 
21   No fixed exchange rate regime is absolutely and unconditionally credible. Even a full monetary union or common 
currency area can break up. Paul de Grauwe and Gunther Schnabl 
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4.1 The Basic Balassa-Samuelson Model 
In the 1960s, Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) observed a similar situation in developing 
countries to that which we are observing today in Central and Eastern Europe. They found that 
developing countries in the economic catch-up process had higher productivity gains in the tradable 
sector than industrial countries. They also observed higher consumer price inflation which contributed 
to a secular ‘catch-up’ of prices.
22 
Our basic version of the Balassa-Samuelson model is a two-country model with a tradable goods 
(industry) and a non-tradable goods (services) sector as described by De Grauwe and Skudelny (2002). 
We assume perfect competition in the tradable goods markets and perfect mobility in the national 
labour markets—but no labour mobility between the two countries. There is no direct competition 
between the non-traded sectors of the two countries and no competition between the traded and non-
traded goods sector within each country.  
The production of traded and non-traded goods in each country is based on two Cobb-Douglas 
production functions for the traded goods sector T and the non-traded goods sector NT:
23  
T T T T T T L K A Y
γ γ − =
1 ) ( ) (  with 0 < γ  <   1         ( 1 a )  
NT NT NT NT NT NT L K A Y
γ γ − =
1 ) ( ) (  with 0 < γ  <   1        ( 1 b )
  
 In equations (1a) and (1b) Y
i is the (real) industrial output, A
i is technology, K
i is (fixed) capital, and 
L
i is the employed labour force in sector i (i=T, NT).
24 In both sectors output is generated by combining 
technology, capital and labour. Assuming competitive markets and profit maximization the marginal 





) 1 ( γ − )
25 must correspond to the real wage in the respective sector. The real 




















= − ) 1 ( γ           ( 2 b )  
Nominal wages in the traded and non-traded sectors are assumed to be equal as perfect labour 
mobility between the traded and non-traded sector is assumed: 
                                                      
22    Indeed, Figure F in the appendix shows that productivity in the traded goods sector—measured as industrial 
(manufacturing) output per worker—grows much faster in most CEE accession countries than in the EMU members 
Spain and Germany. Further, Figure D in the appendix—which plots wholesale prices in relation to consumer prices—
indicates that consumer inflation relative to wholesale price inflation is much higher in most CEE countries. 
23  There is a discussion about the classification of the traded and the non-traded goods sector. Most studies define the industrial 
or the manufacturing sector as traded goods sector and services or the remaining sectors as the non-traded goods sector. 
Some studies include agriculture, mining, transports and tourism into the traded goods sector. Others see evidence that 
agricultures belong to the non-traded sector because of high trade barriers. For an overview see Égert et. al. (2002).  
24  The overall labor force of the economy L is assumed constant: 
NT T L L L + =  
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According to equation (4) if productivity in the non-traded goods sector is—by and large—constant
27, an 
increase in traded goods productivity would push the relative price of non-traded to traded goods upward. As 
the overall consumer price level is a composite of traded and non-traded goods, inflation will rise.  
The Balassa-Samuelson effect is modelled graphically in Figure 3. The transformation curve AA’ 
is derived from the two production functions for traded and non-traded goods (1a/1b). Given a 
constant input of labour L, capital K and technology A, the accession country can produce the 
combinations of traded goods Y
T and non-traded goods Y
NT represented by the production possibility 
frontier AA’. The slope of the production possibility frontier AA’ corresponds to the ratio of the 




c − ). 





− ), which can be derived from both equation (4) and a budget constraint for overall 
demand.
28 In Figure 3 the equilibrium is described by point E where the relative price line is tangent to 
the transformation curve AA’ and where equation (4) applies. Point E is also on the consumption line 
DD’ which assumes for simplicity that at all income levels the consumers prefer the same 
consumption structure of traded and non-traded goods.
29 In the equilibrium E overall production and 
consumption consist of Y
T* plus Y
NT*. 
Simulating the productivity increase in the traded goods sectors of the accession countries—we 
assume a onetime productivity shift in the traded goods sector. In terms of equation (1a) this corresponds 
to an exogenous increase of the productivity factor A
T. The productivity shock shifts the transformation 
curve upward along the y-axis to form the new transformation curve A’’A’ in Figure 3. With the same 
labour and capital input the accession country can now produce more traded goods. As productivity is 
assumed to be constant in the non-traded goods sector, the intersection on the x-axis remains the same.  
The asymmetric productivity shock in favour of the traded goods sector triggers an adjustment of 
relative prices. As described by equation (4) the rise of marginal productivity in the traded goods 
                                                      
26  As γ
T and γ
NT are larger than 0 and smaller than unity. 
27  The assumption of constant productivity in the non-traded goods sector springs from the fact that productivity increases 
in the service sector are slow.  
28  
T T NT NT Y P Y P Y * * + = . 
29   We assume for the sake of brevity that the consumption pattern is not sensitive to relative price changes which 
corresponds to a Leontief-type utility function. In the case of convex utility functions changes in relative prices would 
trigger substitution effects between traded and non-traded causing a shift of the consumption line inwards. The main 
findings would be unchanged, however.  Paul de Grauwe and Gunther Schnabl 
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sector implies—given that productivity in the non-traded goods sector is constant (
NT Q )—an upward 
shift of non-traded goods prices in comparison to traded goods prices. 
Due to the productivity increase in the traded goods sector the relative price line CC’ is steeper. 
The equilibrium shifts to point F where the shares for traded and non-traded goods remain 
unchanged.
30 The markets of both traded and non-traded goods are in equilibrium, as in both cases 
supply meets demand. Because non-traded goods prices make up a significant part of overall 
consumer prices, inflation in the accession country rises.  
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Note: c is assumed to be equal to 1. PE corresponds to the price level of the Euro Area. 
4.2. Restrictions on the Adjustment Mechanism 
We learn from Figure 3 that non-traded goods prices and subsequently inflation provide an adjustment 
mechanism for relative productivity increases in the traded goods sector. To model the impact of the Maastricht 
criteria on the adjustment mechanism as described in section 4.1. Balassa’s (1964) and Samuelson’s (1964) 
approach is extended to a two country setting with both a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime. 
As observed during the economic catch-up process of Japan the impact of productivity growth in 
the traded goods sector on consumer price inflation depends on the exchange rate arrangement. 
Similar to the CEE countries today, Japan experienced higher productivity growth than other 
industrialized countries (US) during the 1960s up to the late 1980s. A regime shift in the exchange 
arrangement has taken place during this period—from the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate regime 
(360 yen/dollar) to flexible rates since 1973.  
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As shown in Figure 4 this regime shift can be associated with a structural break in the ratio of 
Japan’s consumer price inflation relative to US consumer price inflation. Under the fixed exchange rate 
regime Japan’s higher inflation provided adjustment for higher productivity growth in the Japanese 
export sector as outlined in section 4.1. When the nominal exchange rate became flexible and the central 
bank started targeting inflation, however, (after a transition period) the relative productivity gains in the 
traded goods sectors showed up in nominal appreciation while inflation was lower than in the US.  

















Bretton Woods fixed parity flexible exchange rates
 
Source: IMF: IFS. 
Thus, while the impact of relative productivity gains in the traded goods sector on the real 
exchange rate against the dollar is the same under both exchange regimes (real appreciation) the 
exchange rate regime matters for the adjustment channel. 
4.2.1. Pegging the Nominal Exchange Rate 
In the CEE countries we are currently able to observe both corner solutions of exchange rate 
arrangements—hard pegs to the euro (Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania) and fully flexible exchange rates 
(Poland).
31 First we scrutinize the impact of fixed exchange rates on the adjustment mechanism that 
applies for the group with hard pegs exchange rate arrangements.  
This case widely resembles the basic model of section 4.2. We assume that Euro Area tradable 
prices are exogenous for the accession country and for simplicity constant (
T
E P ). Further, we assume 
that purchasing power parity holds for the traded goods sector.
32 As the exchange rate of the accession 
country currency is assumed constant against the euro ( E A E / ), traded goods prices in the accession 
                                                      
31  All other countries pursue de facto intermediate exchange rate regimes, as managed floats or downward crawling pegs (Schnabl 2003). 
32   E A
T
E
T E P P / * = .  Paul de Grauwe and Gunther Schnabl 
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country are constant (
T P ) as well. In Figure 3, with fixed nominal exchange rate and fixed traded 
goods prices, higher productivity growth in the traded goods sector pushes non-traded goods prices 
and thereby inflation upwards leading to the equilibrium in point F. Given fixed nominal exchange 
rates, higher consumer price inflation than in the euro zone results in a real appreciation of currency A.  
As shown in Figure 5 this phenomenon can be observed in Estonia which has pegged the kroon 
tightly to the DM (later the euro) since 1992 as plotted in the upper left panel of Figure 5. At the same 
time the productivity in the industrial sector has grown much faster than in Germany (upper right 
panel of Figure 5). As plotted in the lower left panel of Figure 5 despite the tight exchange rate 
stabilization against DM and euro the inflation differential between Estonia and Germany/Euro Area 
has not disappeared, supporting the argument of productivity-driven inflation. The combination of a 
stable nominal exchange rate against the euro and higher inflation leads to a gradual real appreciation 
of the kroon as predicted by the Balassa-Samuelson effect (lower right panel of Figure 5). 

























































































































        
real exchange rate (CPI & WPI based) 
Sources: OECD and IMF. Relative productivity index calculated as industrial output/industrial employment (Estonia) minus 
industrial output/employment (Germany) both normalized to 1995:02=100. Germany represents the euro area since 1999. 
 
4.2.2. Pegging Inflation 
We assume that a country chooses to ‘peg’ inflation, i.e., to adjust consumer price inflation (close to) 
the EMU level while floating the exchange rate freely. While all CEE countries made monetary policy 
with respect to exchange rate targets throughout most of the 1990s, some CEE countries—in particular 
Poland and to a certain extent the Czech and Slovak Republics—have moved recently towards 
inflation targets leaving the exchange rate to float (more) freely.  
The Maastricht inflation criterion requires the accession countries to bring inflation (close) to the Euro 
Area level, which means that relative productivity cannot adjust via non-traded goods prices as assumed in Nominal versus Real Convergence with Respect to EMU Accession 
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section4.2.1. Instead, as observed in Japan during the post Bretton-Woods period, the nominal exchange 
rate will change. This case also corresponds to Figure 3. But now, with prices of foreign traded goods 
assumed exogenous and constant (
T
E P ) and (non-traded goods) inflation fixed to the EMU level (
NT
E P ), 
nominal exchange rate appreciation shifts the equilibrium to point F. Because inflation is fixed to the Euro 
Area level, nominal appreciation against the euro is equal to real appreciation.
33 
Figure 6 shows this finding for Poland. The observation period starts in the year 2000 when Poland 
abandoned its currency basket arrangement and decided to float its currency. As shown in the lower left 
panel of Figure 6 Poland reduced consumer price inflation starting in the year 2000, and the inflation 
differential to Germany gradually declined vanishing by mid 2002. As the productivity increases in the 
traded goods sector continued (upper right panel of Figure 6) this implied both a nominal and a real 
appreciation of the Polish zloty as shown in the upper left and the lower right panel of Figure 6. 











































































































          
real exchange rate (CPI & WPI based) 
Sources: OECD and IMF. Relative productivity index calculated as manufacturing output/manufacturing employment (Poland) 
industrial output/employment (Germany) both normalized to 1995:02=100. Germany represents the euro area since 1999. 
4.2.3. Pegging Exchange Rate and Inflation 
From sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 we observe that imposing restrictions on either the nominal exchange 
rate or inflation does not constitute any major problem for the adjustment process. Both higher 
consumer price inflation (given fixed exchange rates) and nominal appreciation (given fixed inflation) 
allow for the real appreciation necessary to equilibrate relative productivity gains. 
                                                      
33  Real appreciation will also induce an adjustment of the current account to net capital inflows. As additional net capital 
inflows will be spent on both traded and non-traded goods, the current account deficit would be ceteris paribus smaller 
than net capital inflows. The higher relative prices on non-traded goods will shift the demand to traded goods to ensure 
that the current account is matched by the capital account.  Paul de Grauwe and Gunther Schnabl 
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But combining both restrictions as required by the Maastricht criteria constitutes the problem modelled 
in Figure 7. With the nominal exchange rate, traded goods prices and (non-traded goods) inflation fixed, the 
slope of the new price line GG’ remains unchanged shifting the new equilibrium to H. Due to higher 
productivity at constant relative prices and given fixed capital stock the preferred relative production 
pattern changes. More traded goods (Y
T**> Y
T*) and less non-traded goods (Y
NT** < Y
NT*) are produced.  



































Note: c is assumed to be equal to 1. PE corresponds to the price level of the Euro Area. 
At constant relative prices the preferred consumption point remains at point I, putting both markets 
for traded and non-traded goods into disequilibrium. In the traded goods market the production of traded 
goods Y
T** is larger than the preferred consumption of traded goods I




34 In the non-traded goods market—with traded goods prices lower than in the equilibrium—the 
production of non-traded goods Y
NT** is smaller than the private demand for non-traded goods I
NT. Since 
services are by definition not traded there is an upward pressure on non-traded goods prices.  
5. How to Cope with the Dilemma 
In the most positive scenario for the post EU-accession developments, the new member states have to 
stay in the ERM2 for at least two years before they can enter the EMU. Due to the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect and other factors
35 which enforce the price gap between traded and non-traded goods a tight peg to 
the euro might produce an inflation rate above the Maastricht ceiling as is presently being experienced in 
pre-entry Estonia or post-entry Ireland. Adjusting inflation to the EMU level might—as currently in 
Poland—cause appreciation pressure to place exchange rate stability against the euro at risk. 
Under these circumstances, it would be the easiest solution to renegotiate either the Maastricht 
inflation criterion or the Maastricht exchange rate criterion. As the original Maastricht criteria have been 
                                                      
34  For countries that run a current account deficit the deficit would be less and net capital imports would decline. 
35  As indicated in footnote 47. Nominal versus Real Convergence with Respect to EMU Accession 
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designed for countries that were by and large at the same stage of economic development, it seems 
appropriate to design new Maastricht criteria for the faster growing CEE countries (Szapáry, 2000).  
Providing a possible framework for such a modification, McKinnon (1984) proposed an international 
monetary standard based on fixed exchange rates and the stabilization of traded goods (wholesale) prices 
among the US, Japan and Germany in the 1980s. McKinnon (1984) argued that stable traded goods 
prices would be consistent with long-run exchange rate stability because they would allow high growth 
economies (Japan) higher productivity growth in the traded goods sector. Higher consumer price 
inflation could be tolerated without endangering the goal of nominal exchange rate stability. 
Similarly, Buiter and Grafe (2002: 41) propose to maintain the fixed exchange rate requirement 
while applying the inflation criterion to traded goods only as an ‘elegant solution’ to the convergence 
dilemma. If the measurement for inflation were restricted to traded goods, the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect would not matter for the EMU entry. Productivity-driven ‘good’ inflation would only show up 
in the non-traded goods sector and would thus be ex ante excluded from the EMU qualification 
process. At the same time monetary policy in the accession countries would be ‘under control’ as 
exchange rates remain fixed to the euro.  
According to Buiter and Grafe (2002: 41-42) an alternative option could be ‘a waiver’ or 
‘derogation’ to the inflation criterion for countries with a strong Balassa-Samuelson effect. But both 
the renegotiation and the complete derogation of (one of) the Maastricht criteria seem impracticable, 
as they would violate the ‘prerequisite of equal treatment’. The ECB (2000) and the ECOFIN Council 
(2000) are signalling that the new EU Member States have to fulfil the same criteria as the present 
members: ‘The assessment of the fulfilment of the Maastricht convergence criteria and the procedures 
to be followed for the introduction of the euro will ensure equal treatment between future Member 
States and the current participants in the euro area.’ (ECOFIN, 2000)
36 
5.1. Fiscal Tightening 
Given that the renegotiation of the Maastricht criteria is quite unrealistic, the governments of the CEE 
countries have to consider restrictive macroeconomic policies in order to cope with the Balassa-
Samuelson effect and other ‘non-monetary’ inflation pressure. Buiter and Grafe (2002: 41) suggest 
that the candidate EMU members need a transitional recession for at least one year to depress the 
inflation rate to the level required by the Maastricht treaty. Natalucci and Ravenna (2002) as well as 
Gros et al. (2002:) argue that a restrictive macroeconomic policy would dampen the price gap between 
traded and non-traded goods and thereby the upward-drift of consumer price inflation.
37 As—by 
definition—monetary policy in ERM2 will be primarily committed to exchange rate stability, fiscal 
policy will be the main macroeconomic tool to adjust inflation.  
To this end Halpern and Wyplosz (2002) suggest that prices in the non-traded sector are not solely 
determined by supply factors (as productivity) but also by demand factors. They argue that rising 
productivity in the traded goods sector not only pushes consumer prices upward, but also increases 
income, wealth—and thereby consumption. Relative traded and non-traded goods prices can be 
effected in different ways depending on the private consumption pattern: (1) If the demand
 for both 
traded and non-traded goods grows at the same rate, the demand effect is neutral and the price gap is 
solely driven by the supply effects. (2) If the growth of private aggregate demand is biased towards the 
traded goods sector the supply side effect is (partly) offset by the income effects. (3) If consumer 
demand is biased towards non-traded goods the Balassa-Samuelson effect is enforced.  
                                                      
36  This assessment also explains why ECOFIN and ECB are objected to early euroization as proposed by Nuti (2001). A 
similar argument is made by Deutsche Bundesbank (2003: 19). 
37  The year 1999 might be provide a blueprint when—for instance in Estonia—a restrictive monetary policy triggered a 
strong recession which was accompanied by a sharp decline of inflation. Paul de Grauwe and Gunther Schnabl 
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Comparing the three effects Halpern and Wyplosz (2002) argue that higher income usually induces a 
higher private demand for services—and hence conclude that the demand side effect would reinforce the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect. Thus, if private demand is assumed to be biased towards non-traded goods, higher 
income taxes would crowd out private consumption thus alleviating the upward pressure on inflation.  
A similar argument can be made with respect to exogenous changes of government demand on 
non-traded goods prices. As government demand is assumed to be dominated by services, a restrictive 
fiscal policy could dampen the productivity-driven upward pressure on non-tradable goods prices. The 
impact of fiscal tightening on non-traded goods prices is even more clear-cut as government 
consumption is exogenous. The government can choose both the level and (to some extend) the 
structure of its consumption pattern, thus neutralizing price pressure on non-traded goods prices and 
shifting the aggregate budget line in the desired direction. 
Starting from the disequilibrium as shown in Figure 7 the impact of higher taxes and/or lower 
government consumption on non-traded goods prices is shown in Figure 8. A decline in government 
expenditure (or higher income tax) has two effects: first, it dampens the upward drift in non-traded 
goods prices. The productivity-driven (upward) supply-side effect is compensated by the (downward) 
demand side effect. The slope of the budget constraint BB’ remains unchanged, implying an 
equilibrium in H on the GG’ line. Second, as the disposable income declines and aggregate demand 
falls the budget line shifts downward to—say—JJ’.  
The new equilibrium will be in point K, which satisfies both the Maastricht exchange rate and 
inflation criteria. K lies on the consumption path meaning that the equilibrium is sustainable, and the 
supply of non-traded goods (Y
NT**) is equal to the demand for non-traded goods (K
NT). In the traded 
goods market with the production point remaining at H the trade surplus—defined as the production of 






new equilibrium will be at the expense of an economic slowdown as the budget line GG’ shifts 
downward to JJ’. The loss of aggregate demand corresponds to I
NT—K
NT.  










































Note: c is assumed to be equal to 1. PE corresponds to the price level of the Euro Area. 
                                                      
38  For countries running a trade deficit it will decline.  Nominal versus Real Convergence with Respect to EMU Accession 
EUI-WP RSCAS No. 2004/20 © 2004 Paul de Grauwe and Gunther Schnabl  15 
Thus, while fiscal contraction would help fulfil the Maastricht criteria it would be at the cost of less 
aggregate demand. Whether or not this is harmful for the accession economies remains unclear. Begg 
et. al (2001: 40-41)—who scrutinize the impact of international capital inflows to the present southern 
EMU member states during their EMU run up—argue that tighter fiscal policies were helpful in 
controlling speculative capital inflows and overheating.
39  
The impact of restrictive fiscal policies in the case of overheating is modelled in Figure 9. For 
simplicity we assume the basic case without exogenous productivity shifts. Buoyant demand 
stimulated by hot capital inflows shifts the budget line to the right as the disposable income rises (NN’ 
line). This leads to the new consumption point M where the preferred amount of traded goods M
T is 
larger than the production of traded goods Y
T*. A current account deficit emerges (M
T > Y
T*).
40 On the 
market for non-traded goods demand is larger than supply (M
NT > Y
NT**) which implies a strong 
upward pressure on non-traded goods prices and thereby inflation.  





















A restrictive fiscal policy is able to cope with both the distortions caused by the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect and the overheating caused by capital inflows. The fiscal contraction leads to a lower 
consumption of traded and non-traded goods, while at the same time relative prices remain unchanged. If 
the restrictive effect is large enough the budget line shifts back to the JJ’ line. The new equilibrium is at 
point K. Since the current account deficit—which corresponds to an inflow of (hot) short-term capital—is 
thereby reduced or transformed into a current account surplus, the danger of short-term capital flows is 
counteracted. The stabilization occurs once again at the cost of lower aggregate demand, but has the merit 
of avoiding overheating and contributing to a lower budget deficit and thereby lower interest rates.  
                                                      
39  ‘When any inflows occurred, any expansionary consequences were generally countered by tighter fiscal policy. Thus the 
fiscal elements of the Maastricht criteria may have cushioned a loss of competitiveness by preventing domestic 
overheating. Fiscal policy will remain a crucial component of the smooth accession of accession candidates.’ (Begg et. al. 
2001: viii) 
40  A current account deficit gets larger. Paul de Grauwe and Gunther Schnabl 
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To this end, while a restrictive fiscal policy helps to simultaneously achieve the Maastricht monetary 
and exchange rate criteria, it also contributes to fiscal stability as budget deficits are constrained and the 
stock of public debt are reduced. This could be crucial for these countries whose budgets deficits have 
increased considerably recently as shown in Table 1. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the 
Slovak Republic might need a fiscal contraction to comply with the Maastricht fiscal criteria. 
Table 1: Budget Deficit as Percent of GDP 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003* 
Bulgaria  0.4 -0.5 0.2 -0.6 -0.7 
Czech Republic  -3.7 -4.0 -5.5 -3.9 -5.8 
Estonia  -4.0 -0.4 0.2  1.3 -0.3 
Hungary  -5.6 -3.0 -4.7 -9.2 -4.5 
Latvia  -5.3 -2.7 -1.6 -3.0 -3.1 
Lithuania  -5.7 -2.6 -2.2 -2.0 -2.1 
Poland  -1.5 -1.8 -3.0 -4.1 -4.0 
Romania  -4.5 -4.6 -3.3 -2.2 -2.5 
Slovak Republic  -6.4 -10.4 -7.3  -7.2  -4.9 
Slovenia  -2.2 -3.3 -2.8 -2.6 -1.4 
Source: European Commission: Enlargement Paper No. 17 – September 2003. * planned. 
Note however that the overall effect on the fiscal criteria remains unclear, since recession will cause the 
revenue-side tax income to decline. Further, the sudden turn-around in fiscal policy could be destabilizing 
for two reasons. First, timing and scope of fiscal policy measures might fail. Second, as attributed by 
Szapáry (2000), the stop and go in fiscal policy might bring about cyclical fluctuations similar to those 
experienced prior to the monetary union. The fiscal contraction will induce a stronger recession before 
EMU entry, after the EMU accession the fiscal expansion will enforce an economic upswing.  
5.2. Nominal Appreciation within ERM2 
Thus, while fiscal tightening could contribute to the fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria, it constitutes 
discretionary government intervention incorporating considerable losses to aggregate demand and the 
danger of possible failure in timing or dosage. In contrast, nominal appreciation within ERM2 could 
provide a ‘natural’ adjustment mechanism for productivity differentials, and no discretionary 
government intervention would be necessary.  
Losses to aggregate demand would be less. Figure 3 and Figure 8 show the different impact of 
fiscal tightening and nominal appreciation on aggregate demand. In the case of fiscal tightening 
adjustment is solely achieved by the contraction of aggregate demand without changing relative prices 
between traded and non-traded goods. In Figure 8 fiscal tightening shifts the consumption point 
inward from I (GG’ line) to K (JJ’ line) while the production point remains at H. The loss in aggregate 
demand corresponds to I
NT—K
NT (non-traded goods).  
Nominal appreciation adjustment is achieved through changes in relative prices and thereby 
expenditure switching. As shown in Figure 3, a nominal appreciation shifts the equilibrium to point F 
(CC’ line). Without relative price changes, the equilibrium would correspond to point F’ on the PP’ 
line with output and consumption at Y
T*** and Y
NT***. The loss in aggregate demand—corresponding 
to Y
NT***—Y
NT**—is less than in the case of fiscal contraction (I
NT—K
NT).  Nominal versus Real Convergence with Respect to EMU Accession 
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This finding suggests a reinterpretation of the Maastricht exchange rate criterion without 
renegotiation. Instead of fiscal tightening the CEE accessions countries could allow a gradual 
appreciation of their currencies within ERM2. A downward moving exchange rate would provide a 
‘safety valve’ for appreciation pressure caused by relative productivity gains. 
Indeed the European Council has signalled that the ERM2 band is wide enough ‘to accommodate the 
varying degrees, paces and strategies of economic convergence of Member States outside the euro area 
joining the mechanism’ (ECOFIN, 1997: 1.7, 1.8). Alike the ECB (2000: 46) states that the ERM2 
mechanism ‘should allow sufficient flexibility for accession countries to reconcile price and exchange rate 
stability with the structural evolution of their economies, thereby accommodating their different needs.’
41  
How could the exchange rate movements within ERM2 work? Pre-EMU entry Ireland and pre-
EMU entry Greece provide the possible blueprints.  
5.2.1. The ‘Flexible’ Irish Model 
The Irish pound has participated in the ERM1 since 1978. In the early 1990s, the bilateral central rate 
against the DM was at 0.37 pound per DM with a fluctuation band of ±2.25%. During the 1993 EMS 
crisis the bilateral central rate against the DM was devalued by about 11% to 0.42 pound per DM in 
February 2002. In the August 1993 the bandwidth was extended to ±15%. Under the new band the 
Irish pound experienced wide fluctuations around the central rate but within the limits. The pound 
depreciated considerably against the DM until late 1995 and thereafter appreciated strongly, which 
was in line with the significant productivity growth relative to the EU core countries (Figure 10).  

























ERM1 bilateral central rate
lower limit
 
Source: IMF: IFS 
In contrast to the other later future EMU founding members who kept the bilateral exchange rates 
of their currencies close to the bilateral central rates during the two-year ‘EMU probationary period’, 
                                                      
41  A similar argument is made by Deutsche Bundesbank (2003: 20). Paul de Grauwe and Gunther Schnabl 
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the nominal appreciation of the Irish pound set the stage for the ‘end game’ in the Irish currency 
policy. The Irish government could choose a high or a low EMU entry rate (Honohan 1997).  
In December 1997—one year before the planned EMU entry—the Irish currency was quoted at 
around 8% below the bilateral DM central rate. Because the central rate could be expected to correspond 
to the final conversion rate (fixed rate rule), this implied—given no further policy measures—an 8% 
depreciation of the Irish pound over the next twelve months (Figure 10). Such a sharp depreciation could 
be, but not necessarily needed to be, counteracted by a revaluation of the bilateral central rates. 
Given the prior appreciation of the pound, the Irish government had two options of setting the final 
entry rate. Leaving the bilateral central rates unchanged would have meant —given the fixed rate 
rule—that the prevalent bilateral central rates would have corresponded to the final bilateral EMU 
entry rates. As exchange rates were likely to be more responsive to changes in market expectations 
than short-term interest rates, without revaluation the final announcement of the conversion rates could 
be expected to trigger a jump of the exchange rate towards the conversion rate.
42 Such sharp 
depreciation would have stimulated growth, but would also have caused additional inflationary 
pressure to the (post-) EMU entry Irish economy—possibly putting the Maastricht inflation criterion at 
risk and contributing to overheating. From a long-term perspective, entering the EMU at a 
considerably lower rate than the then market rate would have ensured sustained wage and price 
competitiveness within the monetary union.  
The alternative was to revalue the bilateral central rates to avoid such sharp depreciations. If, for 
instance, the bilateral central rate had been revalued by 8% no upward pressure on prices and wages 
would have emerged, but at the cost of less growth stimulus From a long-term perspective, Ireland 
would have missed the chance to enter the EMU undervalued.
43  
The Irish government opted for a 3% revaluation of the bilateral central rates in March 1998 which 
corresponded to a compromise between depreciation and ‘complete’ revaluation. The market exchange 
rates of the Irish pound jumped against the new bilateral parities. In June 1998 the prevalent bilateral 
central rates were fixed as irrevocable EMU entry rates. 
Applying the Irish model to the CEE currencies would provide flexibility to exchange rate movements 
prior to the final conversion rates. Several authors such as Corker et al. (2000) have suggested that quick 
reversals of short term capital flows (convergence plays) might (more) easily be accommodated under a 
(more) flexible exchange rate arrangement than under fixed rate regimes during the EMU accession period. 
Given an exchange rate corridor of ±15%, defining the ERM2 entry rate as ERM2 central rate would allow 
considerable exchange rate fluctuations prior to the final fixing of the conversion rate.
44  
If erratic exchange rate fluctuations are allowed—depending on short-term capital flows—both 
depreciation and appreciation are possible. But given the relative productivity growth in the CEE 
economies (more erratic rather than gradual) appreciation is the more probable case. Just as occurred 
in Ireland nominal appreciation will create a strategic position for the final fixing of the EMU 
conversion rate. When deciding about revaluations prior to EMU entry, the governments in the 
accession countries can weigh the negative effects of additional inflationary pressure against the 
merits of higher (short-term) competitiveness. The possible scope of sustained ‘beggar-thy-EMU-
                                                      
42  Depreciation was also suggested by interest rate differentials. Despite the appreciation of the Irish pound Irish short-term 
and long-term interest rates had remained higher than in Germany.  
43  Note, that in the discussion about the Irish final entry rate relative productivity growth did not play an important role. 
This could be due to the fact that prior to EMU entry exchange rate expectations were dominated by the fixing of the 
final conversion rate instead of productivity.  
44  After and even some time prior to the final fixing of the EMU conversion rates exchange rate fluctuations against the 
euro will abate as shown by De Grauwe, Dewachter and Veestraeten (1999). Nominal versus Real Convergence with Respect to EMU Accession 
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neighbour’
45 depreciation will depend on the degree of prior nominal appreciation. The larger the prior 
appreciation the stronger the competitiveness effect when the central rate remains unchanged. 
Given that the ERM2 entry rate corresponds to the ERM2 central rate—will the lower 15% ERM2 
corridor suffice to equilibrate the Balassa-Samuelson effect? As stated by Begg et al. (2001: 47) in 
Central and Eastern Europe ‘the scope for […] real appreciation will remain considerably larger than 
that experienced in previous accessions’. If the monetary authorities allow erratic fluctuations of 
exchange rates within the ERM2 limits it is uncertain whether exchange rates will be driven by 
relative productivity gains or short-term capital flows during the EMU probationary period. Assuming 
that relative productivity gains will be roughly reflected by nominal exchange rate movements, the 
degree of real appreciation pressure matters.  
The estimations of real appreciation in the CEE countries such as those made by Halpern and Wylposz 
(2002: 19-20) find that the Balassa-Samuelson effect will cause a yearly (real and nominal) appreciation of 
around 3.5%. A panel estimation of De Broeck and Sløk (2001) quantifies the productivity-driven real 
appreciation in the accession countries to about 1.5% per annum. The estimations of Kovács (2003) for five 
CEE economies find that the Balassa-Samuelson effect vis-á-vis Germany has not exceeded 2% per 
annum, a value that he considers similar to Spain before its EMU entry.
46 Borowski, Brzozina and Szpunar 
(2003) estimate the Balassa-Samuelson effect for Poland to be at 1.2 to 1.7% per year. 
Buiter and Grafe (2002: 40) summarize the literature on the quantification of real appreciation and 
conclude that despite a caveat on the estimation methodologies, the real appreciation of the CEE 
currencies against the euro due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect appear to be in the range of 1.5% to 
2.5% per annum. Indicating other forces
47 capable of reinforcing the appreciation trend they estimate 
an annual equilibrium real appreciation not higher than 3.5% to 4.0%.  
For additional evidence on the scope of real appreciation in Central and Eastern Europe Table 2 
shows yearly CPI-based real appreciation since the start of EMU in January 1999. We assume that 
inflation rates are equal to the Euro Area and thereby real appreciation corresponds to nominal 
appreciation. Table 2 reveals that the all-year all-country average of -3.08% roughly corresponds to 
the results reported above. This suggests that on average the 15% lower part of the corridor will easily 
accommodate relative productivity gains. Country-by-country real appreciation differs significantly 
ranging from -0.29% in Slovenia up to -6.50% in the Slovak Republic. Extrapolating the Slovak trend 
in real appreciation would suggest that even the country with the highest real appreciation would not 
exceed the lower 15% ERM2 limit within two years. Yet the longer ERM2 membership continues the 
higher is the probability of revaluations.  
As the wide ERM2 band would be enough to accommodate the Balassa-Samuelson driven real 
nominal appreciation, the role of revaluations will be mainly restricted to balancing the pros and cons 
of depreciation shocks prior to the EMU entry. This picture changes if the April 2003 proposition of 
EU Commissioner of Monetary Affairs Pedro Solbes to narrow the ERM2 band for the new EU 
members to ±2.25% is taken into account.  
Ignoring the delicate issue of fairness (wider margins were allowed to the present members than 
would be allowed to the new ones) the narrow bandwidth proposed by Solbes will affect both 
exchange rate variability and the decisions about the final conversion rates. A bandwidth of 2.25% 
                                                      
45  Competitive depreciations may also incorporate depreciation against the currencies of other EMU accession members 
with respect to competitiveness in the (third) EMU market. 
46  But as shown in Figure D and Figure F in the appendix, relative productivity gains in most CEE countries are much 
larger than in pre-EMU entry Spain. 
47  Lower costs for capital would increase the capital-labor ratios in the tradable sector and thus would contribute to higher 
wages in the tradable sector. Changes in sectoral wages, sectoral pricing and intermediate product prices can cause 
appreciation. Yet the Balassa-Samuelson effect decreases in magnitude as catching up proceeds Kovács (2003).  Paul de Grauwe and Gunther Schnabl 
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would by-and-large correspond to a fixed exchange rate regime. Nominal appreciation could hardly 
control short-term capital inflows and productivity-driven appreciation.  
 
Table 2: Yearly CPI-Based Real Appreciation in CEE Economies 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 mean 
Bulgaria  -5.25 -6.45 -3.44 2.27 -3.22 
Czech Republic  8.00 -4.14 -8.92 0.18 -1.22 
Estonia  -1.87 -3.32 -0.89 -0.79 -1.72 
Hungary  -6.41  -3.41 -11.70 -3.34  -6.22 
Latvia  -12.14 -0.68  -2.35 -10.92 -1.06 
Lithuania  -12.17 -5.03  -5.74  1.61  -5.33 
Poland  -6.79 -11.82 -7.28 15.00 -2.72 
Romania  -8.69 -3.24 -7.63 9.42 -2.54 
Slovak Republic  -11.78 -1.91  -5.40  -6.91  -6.50 
Slovenia  -1.38 1.11 -0.18 -0.70 -0.29 
mean  -5.85 -3.89 -5.35 0.58 -3.08 
Source: IMF: IFS. Negative signs correspond to real appreciation. 
Only revaluations of the ERM2 central rate could help to control both nominal appreciation caused by the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect and short-term hot capital flows, but with less flexibility. The margin for nominal 
appreciation to cope with the Balassa-Samuelson effect would be 2.25% under the Solbes proposal. Based on 
the results reported in Table 2 and assuming that exchange rates appreciate gradually we can extrapolate the 
past real appreciation of the CEE EU accession countries. Six out of ten CEE countries would reach the lower 
limit ERM2 limit within one year, eight out of ten countries within two years.  
In practice, however, erratic exchange rate fluctuations might be difficult to distinguish from 
productivity-driven appreciation pressure contributing more to uncertainty about revaluations (and 
possibly crisis) than to exchange rate stability.  
5.2.2. The ‘Rigid’ Greek Model   
While the Irish model has the merit of flexibility, it suffers from sharp exchange rate movements prior 
to the final fixing of the entry rate. The Greek model might provide an alternative, as it rules out sharp 
exchange rate fluctuations from the very beginning of ERM2 entry. 
The Greek EMU entry process is shown in Figure 11. Before entering ERM2 the Greek drachma 
had continuously depreciated against the other European currencies.
48 On March 16
th 1998 the Greek 
drachma entered the ERM1 at a central rate that corresponded to a 12.3 devaluation of the drachma 
(Kontolemis, 2003: 33).
49 In the September 1998, the Greek government announced to participate in 
ERM2 with a bandwidth of ±15.0%. In January 1999 Greece entered ERM2. The ERM2 central rate 
                                                      
48  In contrast to the CEE countries Greece did not exhibit a (strong) productivity increase relative to the Euro Area.  
49  The devaluation was considered important with respect to EMU membership in order to correct for an overvaluation of 
the drachma which would have led to a further deterioration of the current account and weaker growth prospects. Nominal versus Real Convergence with Respect to EMU Accession 
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was set at 353.109 drachmas per euro—about 7.5% above the then market rate of around 329 
drachmas per euro on December 31 1998 (Garganas, 2003).  



























Source: IMF: IFS. Before January 1999 the DM represents the euro. 
Because the ERM2 central rate against the euro was expected to correspond to the final conversion 
rate (fixed rate rule), this implied a nominal depreciation of the drachma within the ERM2 band. The 
central rate provided the upper limit for the depreciation because any rise beyond the central rate 
would have caused doubts about Greece’s ability to enter EMU. To prevent destabilizing speculation 
the Greek central bank would have been obliged to intervene against any depreciation beyond the 
central rate. Thus in effect, the ERM2 bandwidth was reduced to 15% with the exchange rate moving 
upward (depreciation) within a 7% to 8% corridor towards the central rate.  
6. Conclusion 
The accession of the Central and Eastern European economies to the European Union is approaching 
fast. This poses the question about the EMU membership of the young members. As the CEE 
countries have explicitly indicated their strong intention to join the EMU as soon as possible they face 
the Maastricht dilemma of real and monetary convergence. Although the Maastricht criteria have been 
designed for countries with similar levels of development there is no indication that they will be 
redesigned for the new accession candidates.  
This paper discussed fiscal contraction and nominal appreciation as the two main options to 
achieve the EMU membership. Fiscal contraction will be at the expense of a temporary recession. As 
Begg et al. (2001) put it, ‘the fixed exchange rate route is likely to be the most painful’ as losses to 
aggregate demand are considerable. The cost of a recession is less if the economy suffers from 
overheating or if fiscal contraction is needed to achieve fiscal convergence.  
Gradual appreciation within ERM2 seems the better choice for two reasons. First, it does not 
necessitate any discretionary government action, thereby avoiding a possible policy failure (in timing Paul de Grauwe and Gunther Schnabl 
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and dosage). Second, the dampening effects on output will be less than under fiscal tightening as 
expenditure switching accounts for adjustment.  
Having once opted for gradual appreciation the Irish case could be the blueprint for ERM2 
membership. Defining the ERM2 entry rate as the ERM2 central rate provides a high degree of 
flexibility during the probationary period, but it also opens the door to strategic behaviour with respect 
to the EMU entry rate. Before the final fixing of the EMU entry rate the EMU accession countries 
have to ponder positive competitiveness effects of depreciation against the danger of additional 
inflationary pressure in the post-EMU entry period. 
The Greek model might be the right choice for these countries which want to minimize exchange 
rate fluctuations and determine a clear path towards EMU membership. This strategy requires a strict 
time schedule for EMU membership and the strict fulfilment of all Maastricht criteria after the two 
years ‘waiting room’ is indispensable. 
Although nominal appreciation within the ERM2 corridor seems the optimal choice to reconcile 
nominal and real convergence, these countries that decided to adopt hard pegs to the euro (Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Lithuania and potentially Latvia) will have to rely on fiscal contraction and will have to 
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Appendix 
 
Figure A: Monetary Convergence I: Consumer Price Inflation (percent) 
Figure B: Monetary Convergence II: Short-term Interest Rates (percent) 
Figure C: Monetary Convergence III: Nominal Exchange Rates against DM/Euro 
Figure D: Productivity Measure I: Relative Producer and Consumer Prices  
Figure E: Productivity Measure II: Real Exchange Rates of CEE countries (against DM/Euro) 
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Source: IMF: IFS.  Note Different Scale for Romania 
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